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Overview
The global economic recovery is con-
tinuing but at a somewhat slower pace than
was anticipated six months ago. Specifi-
cally, using the country weights from the
IMF’s World Economic Outlook, the fore-
cast for real GDP growth in the world
economy during 2002 (i.e., on a fourth-
quarter-to-fourth-quarter basis) is cut by
about half a percentage point to 3 percent—
a pace that is slightly below my estimate
of the potential growth rate for world GDP.1
This downward revision reflects primarily
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slower growth than earlier expected during
the first half of 2002 in most industrial
countries and the expectation that growth
will remain somewhat more sluggish than
earlier expected at least through year-end.
For 2003, the forecast for global economic
growth is also cut by about half a percent-
age point—to 4 percent—reflecting both
general factors suggesting slightly weaker
performance in many industrial and devel-
oping countries and the particular economic
risks arising from possible military action
against Iraq and from potential credit events
affecting key developing countries. Despite
these downward revisions, however, there
is little doubt that the world economy will
see significant improvement this year from
the 1 percent growth recorded in 2001, and
it is still reasonable to expect further im-
provement to a growth rate modestly above
global potential during 2003.2 (See table 1.)
Slower than anticipated recovery dur-
ing the first half of 2002 was particularly
apparent in the industrial countries, espe-
1. Forecasts reported are rounded off to the nearest
quarter percentage point. The forecast for Q4/Q4
world GDP growth for 2002 reported in early April
was rounded up slightly to 3¾ percent (see table
3), while the present reported forecast is rounded
down slightly to 3 percent (see table 2). The
difference in the unrounded forecasts is closer to ½
percent than to ¾ percent.
2. The year-over-year results show only a one-half
percent increase in global growth, 2 to 2½ percent
between 2001 and 2002. The fourth-quarter-to-
fourth quarter figures reveal a substantial
acceleration from 1 percent to 3 percent global
growth.
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cially the three largest industrial countries; and the
main issue for global growth prospects is whether
this performance will improve going forward. For the
United States, the key questions are (1) how well
will the growth of consumption spending be sus-
tained in the face of relatively weak employment gains
and falling equity prices, but rising real estate val-
ues and very low interest rates? (2) when and to what
extent will gains in business fixed investment take
over from recovery of inventory investment as a prin-
cipal driver of domestic demand? and (3) in the face
of a somewhat weaker dollar, how much will further
deterioration of US net exports weigh on US GDP
growth? For Western Europe, the main question is
what will stimulate a somewhat more rapid pace of
domestic demand growth, especially in view of the
apparent unwillingness of the key monetary author-
ity to supply further stimulus and the constraint on
fiscal expansion implied by the Growth and Stabil-
ity Pact and by longer-run concerns about the fiscal
situations of most Western European governments?
For Japan, the main question is much the same as
for Western Europe—only much more pressing be-
cause of the very limited room for stimulative policy
and because of the concerns about the fragilities of
the financial sector and the urgent need to pursue
critical structural reforms to lay a foundation for sus-
tained growth? For those industrial countries that
have performed somewhat better than expected,
notably Australia and Canada, the question is how
long this superior performance can be sustained if
there is no strengthening of growth in the largest
industrial countries?
As a group, the developing countries appear to
have performed slightly better than expected during
the first half of 2002. However, this is almost en-
tirely due to the somewhat better than expected per-
formances of China (which accounts for one-fourth
of the GDP weight of all developing countries) and
some other Asian emerging-market countries (nota-
bly Korea, Singapore, and Thailand) and to a strong
performance by India (which accounts for one-tenth
of the GDP weight of all developing countries) that
at least matched earlier expectations. Other devel-
oping countries, on average, have performed less well
than expected, particularly so for some Latin Ameri-
can countries (including Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
and Venezuela) that have faced both internal and
external difficulties. Looking ahead, the key issues
appear to be (1) how well will the recovery in Asian
emerging markets be sustained, depending on per-
formance in the industrial countries? (2) how well
will Latin America fare next year, depending on
whether Brazil is or is not successful in avoiding a
major financial crisis? and (3) how might Turkey and
the countries of the Middle East be affected by the
evolving political and military situation with Iraq?
Before turning to the discussion of these issues
for the industrial and developing countries, it is rel-
evant to reflect briefly on the possible broader eco-
nomic implications of potential military action
against Iraq, with the notion that such action might
be initiated within the next six months. When Iraq
invaded and occupied Kuwait in October 1990, the
immediate effect was an upward spike in world oil
prices to over $40 per barrel. This spike in oil prices
and the negative impact on consumer and business
confidence helped to push an already sluggish US
economy into recession and the world economy into
Table 1  Summary of global growth prospects (percent changes in real GDP)
  2001 2002 2003  2001 2002  2003
                                     year/year   year/year      year/year Q4/Q4   Q4/Q4 Q4/Q4
Industrial countries     ¾    1½    2¾    0    2½   2¾
   United States     ¼    2½    3¼    0    3   3¼
   Western Europe    1½    1    2½     ¾    2¼   2½
   Japan     -½    -½    1½   -2    1½   1½
Developing countries    3¼    3¾    5½    2¼    4   5½
World (WEO weights)         2                 2½            4        1           3             4
As a group, the developing countries
appear to have performed slightly
better than expected
during the first half of 2002.           September 2002 PB02-9 3
the slowdown of 1990-91. After the rapid and suc-
cessful conclusion of the Gulf War in February 1991,
however, oil prices plummeted back to around $20
per barrel; and, unlike situations following the more
durable oil price rises of the mid- and late 1970s,
there was no sustained effect on either world eco-
nomic activity or inflation.
In the present situation, world oil prices have
already risen moderately on worries of possible mili-
tary action against Iraq. A decision to proceed with
military action would almost surely push world oil
prices significantly higher, even if other OPEC mem-
bers replace lost Iraqi output. Indeed, experience in
both late 1990/early 1991 and in the autumn of
2000 suggests that when private inventories of oil
are low, panic buying can induce disproportionately
large upward price spikes. In these two episodes (de-
spite their other differences) commitments to release
moderate amounts of oil from official inventories ap-
peared to have substantial effects in calming mar-
ket panic. With official inventories of oil now quite
large, sensible policy management should be able
to offset short-term restrictions of supply and surges
of demand and contain oil price increases to well
below the peaks reached a decade ago.
Moreover, assuming that military operations (but
not necessarily their political aftermath) are rela-
tively quick and successful, the impact on world oil
markets and on the world economy should be com-
paratively modest—probably even less than was the
case in 1990-91. Nevertheless, in view of what now
seems like a high likelihood of military action, some
allowance should be made for the likely negative
economic side-effects. Somewhat arbitrarily, I have
cut my global growth forecasts for 2003 by one-
fourth of a percentage point to make this allowance.
Table 2   Global growth prospects, 2002-03: Assessment as of September 15, 2002
   (annualized percentage real GDP growth rates, year over year and fourth quarter
               to fourth quarter)
       2001      2002    2003   2002   2003
Country/region    year/year  year/year year/year  Q4/Q4            Q4/Q4
Industrial countries         ¾      1½     2¾     2½     2¾
United States            ¼      2½     3¼     3     3¼
Japan           -½      -½     1½     1½     1½
Western   Europe          1½      1     2½     2¼     2½
United   Kingdom          2      1¾     2½     2¼     2½
Euro area          1½      1     2¼     2¼     2½
    Germany            ½       ½     2     2     2¼
    France          1¾      1¼     2½     2½     2½
    Italy          1¾       ¾     2¼     2¼     2½
Developing countries      3¼      3¾     5½     4     5½
Asia          4¾      6     7
    China          7¼      7¾     7¾
    India          4½      5½     6¼
    Other          1¼      4¼     6
Latin America          0     -2     2
    Argentina        -4½   -15     3
    Brazil         1½      1     0
    Mexico          -¼      1¾     4
Central and
    Eastern Europe         2½      3¼     4½
Middle East         2½      2½     3
Africa         3      3     4
World
(WEO weights)         2      2½      4     3     4
Note: The WEO basis world GDP growth rates aggregate the real GDP growth of countries and regions
using weights based on purchasing power parity adjusted measures of exchange rates, which are
slightly modified from those published in the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook.
The modifications involve the following differences with the standard WEO presentation: (1) Three Asian
newly industrialized economies (Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore) plus Taiwan are included in the Asian
developing countries; (2) Russia and most of the former Soviet Union and Turkey are included in Central
and Eastern Europe; (3) Israel (and Egypt) are included in the Middle East.       September 2002 PB02-9 4
(See the appendix for discussion of this allowance.)
Looking beyond next year, a successful outcome in
Iraq would probably help to stabilize world oil mar-
kets and contribute to improved economic perfor-
mance in the region and worldwide.
The Americas
Following the terrorist attack of September 11,
the US economy bounced back surprisingly in the
final quarter of last year, with real GDP growth of
2.7 percent. It then surged forward at a 5 percent
annual rate in the first quarter of 2002, led by a
recovery (to less negative levels) of inventory invest-
ment. In the second quarter, however, growth fell
back to barely 1 percent as gains in inventory in-
vestment and consumption and government spend-
ing all moderated, and net exports made a large nega-
tive contribution to GDP growth. The surprisingly
weak GDP results for the second quarter, the large
(more than 20 percent) drop in equity prices between
early April and late July, and some weak economic
data for June and July suggested that the US recov-
ery might stall out and raised worries about a “double
dip” recession. How serious are these concerns?
The only occasion when the US economy had a
true “double dip” recession—two recessions within
about a year—was in 1980-81. On that occasion,
sharp fluctuations in economic policy, especially
monetary policy, were undoubtedly the key driving
factor. Specifically, in connection with efforts both
to bring down rampant inflation and stabilize the
real economy, the federal funds rate shot up from 9
Table 3   Global growth prospects, 2002-03: Assessment as of March 29, 2002
               (annualized percentage real GDP growth rates, year over year and fourth
  quarter to fourth quarter)
    2001   2002 2003 2002 2003
Country/region  year/year       year/year      year/year          Q4/Q4            Q4/Q4
Industrial countries     1      1½     3¼     3¼     3¼
   United States        1¼      2 ½     4     4     4
  Japan        -½       -½     2     1¾     2
Western Europe        1½      1½     2¾     2½     3
   United  Kingdom        2½      2¼     2½     2½     2½
   Euro area        1½      1½     2¾     2¾     3
      Germany         ½      1     2½     2½     3
      France        2      1¾     2¾     2½     2¾
      Italy        1¾      1½     3     2¾     3
Developing countries    3½      3¾     6     4¼     6
 Asia        4½      5½     7¼
   China        7¼      7     8
   India        4½      5½     6
   Other        1      4     7
Latin America         ¼       -¾     4
   Argentina       -4½  -10 to -15     3
   Brazil        1½      1½     4
   Mexico         -¼      2     5
Central and
   Eastern Europe        2½      3½     5
Middle East        2½      3     3½
Africa        3      3½     4½
World
(WEO weights)        2¼      2¾     4½     3¾     4½
Note: The WEO basis world GDP growth rates aggregate the real GDP growth of countries and regions
using weights based on purchasing power parity adjusted measures of exchange rates, which are slightly
modified from those published in the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook. The
modifications involve the following differences with the standard WEO presentation: (1) Three Asian newly
industrialized economies (Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore) plus Taiwan are included in the Asian
developing countries; (2)  Russia and most of the former Soviet Union and Turkey are included in Central
and Eastern Europe; (3) Israel (and Egypt) are included in the Middle East.        September 2002 PB02-9 5
percent to 22 percent between October 1979 and
February 1980; then collapsed to below 9 percent
by July 1980; and was pushed up again to over 20
percent by year-end. No such extreme fluctuations
in economic policy will occur in present circum-
stances. Indeed, both monetary and fiscal policies
have consistently operated to cushion the recession
and boost recovery; and both monetary and fiscal
policies will add impetus to recovery at least over
the next year. And, if there did appear to be a sig-
nificant risk that the US economy might fall back
into recession, there is no doubt that the Federal
Reserve would act aggressively to avert such an out-
come.
While true “double dips” have been rare histori-
cally and another one now is unlikely, a period of
sluggishness during the initial stages of an economic
recovery is not so unusual. This happened, for ex-
ample, during the so-called “jobless recovery” in
1991-92. Now, with productivity growth apparently
remaining relatively high, real GDP growth a little
above 3 percent appears necessary to keep actual
output rising in line with potential (assuming that
capital is also being accumulated at an appropriate
rate) and to keep labor demand expanding along with
the increase in the labor force. This is consistent
with the fact that since the recovery began in the
final quarter of 2001, with real GDP rising at just
under a 3 percent annual rate, employment has
shown very little growth, and the unemployment rate
has effectively stabilized at about 6 percent of the
labor force.
In early April, my forecast of 4 percent real GDP
growth for the US economy during both 2002 and
2003 implied growth above potential and a gradu-
ally declining unemployment rate. I now forecast
that real GDP growth during the second half of this
year and next year will proceed at a 3¼ percent
annual rate—in line with the potential growth rate
of the US economy. In addition to the allowance for
the economic side-effects of possible military action
against Iraq, the downward revision to the projected
growth rate of real GDP reflects lower presumed
growth rates for consumption and for business fixed
investment. The significant decline in equity values
since early April is the principal reason to antici-
pate somewhat less buoyant consumption and in-
vestment spending.
This effect, however, should not be overesti-
mated. The negative effect on consumption from
lower equity wealth will be importantly offset by the
effect of higher residential real estate values—some-
thing that is likely to be reasonably well sustained
in the face of a highly accommodative monetary
policy. For business fixed investment, low rates of
capacity utilization in many industries and higher
costs of financing through equity and higher inter-
est rate spreads for corporate debt are deterrents.
But, net fixed investment for the entire US economy
is estimated (based on estimates of capital depre-
ciation of the US Department of Commerce) to have
fallen from $500 billion per year at the peak in mid-
2000 to $210 billion per year in mid-2002. Leaving
aside net investment in the residential and govern-
ment sectors, real net investment by private busi-
ness is now very low and in some industries is surely
negative. Thus, even relatively modest prospects for
growth of final demand could have a significant ef-
fect in motivating some recovery in business fixed
investment.
In business cycle recoveries, real GDP normally
rises more rapidly than potential. Thus, a forecast
that real GDP will grow only in line with potential
through the end of 2003 surely leaves room for up-
side surprises. Indeed, growth at a 4 percent an-
nual rate or even somewhat higher is certainly fea-
sible, particularly in view of the accommodative
stances of both monetary and fiscal policies. On the
other hand, there are clearly risks on the downside.
Beyond the uncertainties associated with Iraq, a
drop in equity values back to or below the July lows
would likely deter both consumption and investment
spending both directly and through its effects on
consumer and business confidence. Also, as the
second quarter GDP results demonstrated, further
significant deterioration of US net exports reflect-
A decision to proceed with military
action would almost surely push world
oil prices significantly higher,
even if other OPEC members
replace lost Iraqi output.
In view of what now seems like a
high likelihood of military action
[against Iraq], some allowance
should be made for the likely
negative economic side-effects…
I have cut my global growth
forecasts for 2003 by
one-fourth of a percentage point
to make this allowance.September 2002 PB02-9 6
performing well, the Bank of Canada has taken back
75 basis points of its earlier easing. Monetary policy
nevertheless remains reasonably accommodative,
particularly in view of the still highly competitive
value of the Canadian dollar.
Looking ahead through 2003, the Canadian
economy should grow about in line with, or perhaps
slightly more rapidly, than the United States, thanks
partly to its continuing cost competitiveness advan-
tage relative to its southern neighbor. However, the
potential growth rate of the Canadian economy ap-
pears to be somewhat below that of the United States,
and the remaining margin of slack in the Canadian
economy may not be that large. (The unemployment
rate is now running about 7½ percent, but this is
less than a percentage point above the minimum
achieved in several decades.)  This suggests that Ca-
nadian economic growth at an annual rate of 4 per-
cent or higher would probably occasion significant
further monetary tightening that would bring growth
down to a more sustainable pace. On the other side,
if the US economy were to slow significantly below 3
percent annual growth, there probably would be
meaningful negative spillovers to growth in Canada.
As expected, the Mexican economy is recovering
in the wake of US economic recovery, with second
quarter real GDP showing a 2 percent year-on-year
gain. Turmoil in much of the rest of Latin America
has had little negative spillover for Mexico, with in-
terest rate spreads rising only modestly and capital
inflows remaining relatively buoyant. The downward
correction of the Mexican peso against the US dol-
lar has been moderate and generally desirable, de-
spite putting some upward pressure on inflation.
Looking ahead, prospects for the Mexican economy
are also likely to be closely tied to US economic per-
formance and not to developments elsewhere in Latin
America. If the US economy grows at about its po-
tential, growth in Mexico should probably slightly
exceed 4 percent; and deviations of US growth above
or below potential could well have magnified impli-
cations for Mexico—as was the case the past two
years. As a net oil exporter, however, Mexico should
be somewhat less adversely affected from any short-
term negative economic spillovers from military ac-
tion against Iraq.
In South America, economic conditions gener-
ally remain difficult and prospects uncertain. The
economic and financial catastrophe in Argentina now
appears likely to push real GDP down this year to
the bottom end of the range of a 10 to 15 percent
drop suggested in April—or possibly below it. How-
ever, with Argentine real GDP now about 25 per-
cent below its 1998 peak, and with Argentines re-
learning the skills of operating in an economy with
unstable money and without a functioning finan-
cial system, the bottom has probably been reached.
A sharp recovery of perhaps half of the real GDP
losses of the past year by end 2003 is not an unrea-
sonable prospect. This would be consistent with the
pattern seen in virtually all emerging-market econo-
mies that have suffered severe financial crises since
the mid-1990s. But recovery in Argentina over the
next year or two is unlikely to look like the recover-
ies of Mexico following the tequila crisis or Korea
following the Asian crisis. Much fundamental dam-
age has been done to the Argentine economy and to
its basic institutions, which will take a long time to
fix. Even with the most constructive efforts—well
beyond what the present Argentine government has
been able to achieve—it will likely take a number of
years for Argentina to regain the level of prosperity
achieved in 1998.
Brazil now is the major question mark for Latin
America. With rising concerns about a possible sov-
ereign default and/or debt restructuring, interest
rate spreads on Brazilian bonds rose from around
700 basis points in early April to about 2,500 basis
points at their peak this summer. Subsequently,
with the announcement of a new IMF support pack-
age and reassuring pledges of fiscal responsibility
by the leading candidates in Brazil’s upcoming presi-
dential elections, spreads have fallen back some-
what. Nevertheless, high interest rates and tight
credit conditions weakened economic activity, and
ing weak demand growth in the rest of the world can
be an important break on US economic recovery. In-
deed, sustained recovery of the US economy at rates
matching or exceeding its potential will likely prove
very difficult unless the rest of the world achieves
somewhat stronger growth than that reached in re-
cent quarters.
Turning to Canada, economic recovery has been
moderately stronger and better sustained than south
of the border. Both buoyant growth of domestic de-
mand and a relatively strong trade situation (in com-
parison with the United States) contributed to this
outcome. Although inflationary pressures are not an
immediately pressing concern, with the economy
Sustained recovery of the US economy
at rates matching or exceeding
its potential will likely prove
very difficult unless the rest
of the world achieves somewhat
stronger growth than that
reached in recent quarters.    September 2002 PB02-9 7
Brazil’s growth this year appears likely to reach
barely 1 percent.
For next year, the critical question is whether
or not the new Brazilian government, to be elected
in late October and take office at the start of 2003,
will be able rapidly to reassure financial markets
that policies will be consistent with fiscal
sustainability. If so, then interest rate spreads can
probably recede to levels meaningfully below 1,000
basis points, and there is a reasonable prospect that
economic recovery can push Brazil’s growth during
2003 to 4 percent or better. If not, then interest
rate spreads will remain high, sovereign debt de-
fault and/or restructuring will become a self-fulfill-
ing prophecy, and financial turmoil will grip Brazil’s
economy next year. In this latter scenario, the out-
come need not be, and probably would not be, nearly
as catastrophic as we have seen during the past
year in Argentina. Brazil does not face the difficult
problem of backing away from a very rigid exchange
rate peg, and there in no necessary reason why sov-
ereign debt restructuring would imply a complete
collapse of the financial system and of much of the
institutional underpinnings of a modern market-ori-
ented economy. Undoubtedly, however, sovereign
debt restructuring would be a messy affair; and un-
der this scenario, it would be reasonable to expect a
significant economic contraction in Brazil next
year—say, on the order of a 5 percent drop of real
GDP.
At present, financial markets appear to assess
the probabilities of these two scenarios for Brazil as
about even—up from about a 25 percent risk of re-
structuring suggested in my early April forecast. Us-
ing this market rating of the relative probabilities
indicates a central forecast for Brazil’s real GDP
growth next year of about zero—with a starkly bi-
modal distribution around this central forecast.
In the rest of South America, the Chilean
economy has escaped most of the negative spillover
from problems elsewhere on the continent. Never-
theless, growth this year, at about 2½ percent, will
be well below the trend of the past 15 years. Growth
next year should improve somewhat; but a negative
outcome in Brazil would limit prospects for this im-
provement. In Venezuela, political turmoil is con-
tributing to a sharp fall of about 5 percent in this
year’s real GDP. Next year, the recession may not
get much worse, but there seems little reason to ex-
pect that either the political situation or economic
conditions will get much better. In Colombia, the
guerilla war has been a major negative for growth
this year, and it remains to be seen whether eco-
nomic performance will improve much next year. In
Peru, domestic political problems are less dire, and
economic growth still seems likely to run about 3
percent this year and next—a pace that remains well
below the best of recent years.
Europe
As forecast in early April, recovery in Western
Europe has lagged behind and proceeded at a more
sluggish pace than in North America. Indeed, growth
in Germany (including revisions to 2001 results) has
been significantly more sluggish than expected six
months ago, while growth in the rest of the Western
Europe has been somewhat below that forecast. As
things now stand, it appears that a moderate down-
ward revision, to 2¼ percent from 2¾ percent is ap-
propriate for the forecast of Western European (and,
specifically, for the euro area) economic growth dur-
ing 2002.
The main concern, however, is not this down-
ward revision, but rather that there now appears
little reason to expect the acceleration to 3 percent
real growth in Western Europe during 2003, which
was forecast in April. Potential adverse economic
spillovers from military action against Iraq are part
of the reason for these new doubts. But, beyond this,
there does not seem to be any compelling reason to
expect greater dynamism from Western European
economies. In addition, sharp declines in equity
prices—while not as important for the United
For next year, the critical question
is whether or not the new Brazilian
government, to be elected in
late October and take office
at the start of 2003, will be able
rapidly to reassure financial markets
that policies will be consistent
with fiscal sustainability.
Despite declarations of its continuing
validity and necessity by many
euro area officials, it is now
clear that the Growth and Stability
Pact is seriously flawed.       September 2002 PB02-9 8
States—are clearly a negative influence on consump-
tion and investment spending. Moreover, consumer
and business confidence have weakened in response
to weaker equity prices as well as other economic
developments. And, while the strengthening of the
euro in foreign exchange markets implies a move
toward a more balanced pattern of global growth, it
does not have positive implications for growth in the
euro area.
On the policy front, the French and Italian gov-
ernments have indicated that they will back away
from earlier commitments to near-term reductions
in their fiscal deficits, but additional fiscal stimulus
from these sources (relative to Western Europe as a
whole) will be quite modest. Germany (as well as Por-
tugal) will be under pressure for fiscal contraction
to avoid violating the 3 percent upper limit on the
fiscal deficit in the Growth and Stability Pact. The
budget for the United Kingdom does suggest some
modest additional stimulus; but this is not the case
(and desirably so) for most other Western European
countries.
More generally, despite declarations of its con-
tinuing validity and necessity by many euro area of-
ficials, it is now clear that the Growth and Stability
Pact is seriously flawed. Undoubtedly, most Euro-
pean governments need to move their medium-term
fiscal positions toward balance or (preferably) mod-
erate surplus, particularly in view of mounting pen-
sion and healthcare expenses as populations age.
But, the existing pact, as formulated and imple-
mented, is ineffective and potentially counterproduc-
tive in achieving this desirable objective. Fiscal policy
needs to be more restrained when European econo-
mies are performing well; but the budget discipline
imposed by a pact that focuses on actual budget
deficits inevitably tends to become more lax precisely
when economies are performing well. On the other
side, when economies are performing poorly, adher-
ence to the constraints of the pact (or to budget tar-
gets agreed under its general auspices) are gener-
ally contrary to sound cyclical policy management.
The time has come for European officials to stop
worshipping the Growth and Stability Pact as a di-
vine object and to focus on a reformulated mecha-
nism that would make better economic sense.
With respect to monetary policy, the European
Central Bank (ECB) has wisely kept its short-term
policy interest rate at 3¼ percent, despite earlier in-
dications of an intention to tighten policy. However,
with inflation still running near the top of the ECB’s
tolerance range, monetary easing is not something
that the ECB appears willing to contemplate unless
data indicate that the euro area is faltering toward
recession. With real short-term interest rates in the
euro area well above those in the United States, with
a significantly flatter yield curve in the euro area
than in the United States, and taking account of
the appreciation of the euro and the depreciation of
the dollar since early April, it is clear that euro area
monetary policy is not providing the degree of stimu-
lus to economic recovery that the Federal Reserve is
supplying on the other side of the Atlantic.
If demand growth in the euro area were suffi-
cient and likely to remain sufficient to reduce exist-
ing margins of slack (or if other policies, particu-
larly fiscal policies, were available for the task), then
the ECB’s apparent unwillingness to contemplate
further easing would not be a problem. But, despite
moderate economic recovery, margins of slack have
recently been rising in the euro area, and there is
no assurance that they will not rise further, without
any serious threat of an outright recession.
In this regard, it is clearly unfortunate that the
ECB did not take advantage of the opportunity to
cut its policy interest rate more aggressively in 2001
when the accumulating signs of economic weaken-
ing and the concerns arising from the terrorist at-
tack of September 11 provided a plausible rationale
for greater easing.  Not acting more aggressively then,
makes it difficult for the ECB to rationalize acting
more aggressively now—especially in view of the ECB
rhetorical adherence to price stability as the funda-
mental and virtually exclusive goal of monetary
policy.
The fact is that, like all sensible central banks,
the ECB does adjust its monetary policy (as did the
Bundesbank before it) to help stabilize the real
economy, subject to the constraint that reasonable
price stability is not put at significant risk. Consis-
tent with this general policy orientation, another 75
basis points of monetary easing during 2001, tak-
ing the short-term policy interest rate down to 2½
percent, might reasonably have been justified. The
effects of such additional easing would not have been
large, suggesting that (like the easing actually un-
dertaken by the ECB and the larger easing under-
taken by the Federal Reserve) there would have been
no need to reverse it during 2002. Output would
have been boosted by such an easier monetary policy,
European central bankers…
should devote a little more
attention to how monetary
policy affects budget outcomes
in ways that are beyond the
control of the fiscal authorities.             September 2002 PB02-9 9
but probably by not more than about half of a per-
centage point of euro area GDP by end 2002 and
(assuming that the additional easing was gradu-
ally withdrawn) by not more than about a percent-
age point on the level of GDP by end 2003.
While these output effects would not have been
huge, they certainly would have been worthwhile,
particularly for a euro area and a world economy
operating with significant margins of slack—espe-
cially recognizing that there was little risk of gen-
erating undesirable inflationary pressures.  More-
over, the budget deficits in the euro area generally
decline by about 60 to 70 percent on a cyclical im-
provement in GDP, implying that stronger output
growth induced by a prudently easier monetary
policy would bring, other things equal, smaller bud-
get deficits. Again, the effect would not be large;
but budget deficits that are perhaps six-tenths of 1
percent of GDP smaller (than they otherwise would
be) by end 2003 would have been worthwhile. This
suggests that European central bankers should ex-
pend a little less energy decrying the evils of bud-
get deficits and praising the virtues of the flawed
Growth and Stability Pact and, instead, should de-
vote a little more attention to how monetary policy
affects budget outcomes in ways that are beyond
the control of the fiscal authorities.
With an appropriately modified Growth and Sta-
bility Pact (focusing on cyclically adjusted budget
positions), fiscal policy in the euro area would be
able to make at least a modest contribution of off-
setting the risk of continued sluggishness. More
importantly, further easing of monetary policy could
certainly help to forestall some of this risk, even if
it could not (because of lags) fully recover the fa-
vorable effects of more aggressive easing during
2001.
The forecast of what is most likely to happen
going forward, however, must take account of what
policy is likely to do, not necessarily what it should
do. And, it does not appear that either fiscal or mon-
etary policy in the euro area is likely to do much
more either to catch up for past sluggishness or to
accelerate future recovery. This, together with the
other negative information since early April, sug-
gests a downward revision of projected growth for
Western Europe going forward from a 3 percent
annual rate to a 2½ percent annual rate, with a
standard error of perhaps ¾ of a percentage point
around this central forecast.
In Central and Eastern Europe, events are pro-
ceeding about in line with the forecast of early April.
With world oil prices remaining firm, the Russian
economy appears likely to achieve 4 percent growth
this year; and an upward spike in world oil prices
associated with military action against Iraq would
have short-term economic benefits for Russia. Eco-
nomic conditions have been improving in Turkey;
and positive growth this year in the range of 3 per-
cent or so seems likely. Turkey’s large (and prob-
ably still growing) public debt remains a significant
worry. But, with the imminent possibility of mili-
tary action against Iraq, it seems likely that Turkey
will receive whatever additional official assistance it
needs to avoid debt servicing difficulties in the next
year—leaving to the future the question of where
Turkey will find the resources to repay its rapidly
expanding official debts. Moreover, while military
action against Iraq would pose important political
problems for Turkey and might have negative longer-
run economic implications, the short-term economic
effects seem unlikely to be negative.
In Central Europe, the recent floods have done
considerable damage, especially in the Czech Re-
public (and eastern Germany). On balance, this will
be a short-term economic negative, although clean-
up and rebuilding will have some positive effects on
measured GDP. In Poland, the policies of the new
finance minister will likely provide near-term stimu-
lus to a relatively weak economy, but the sustainability
of these policies beyond the next year or so is ques-
tionable. Elsewhere in Central Europe, performance
is perhaps marginally weaker than earlier expected,
reflecting in part the somewhat weaker than ex-
pected performance in Western Europe; and this
suggests a modest scaling back of the forecast for
future growth.
It is still reasonable to expect that,
despite its many important
internal problems, the Japanese
economy will achieve modest real
growth as part of a general
global economic recovery.
Both China and India are relatively
insensitive to both a potential spike
 in world oil prices and to
modestly slower growth in
the rest of the world.   September 2002 PB02-9 10
Asia
The recently revised quarterly GDP data for Ja-
pan show that real growth was effectively nil in the
first quarter of 2002 and accelerated moderately to
about a 2 percent annual rate in the second quar-
ter. This basically confirms the early April forecast
that the Japanese economy would recover, with a
lag, behind the recovery in the United States and
other leading regions in the global economy. Also as
expected, growth in Japan was heavily dependent
on the export sector, with domestic demand remain-
ing virtually stagnant.
Looking ahead, it is still reasonable to expect
that, despite its many important internal problems,
the Japanese economy will achieve modest real
growth as part of a general global economic recov-
ery. However, several factors point to a slightly more
modest forecast than that I advanced in April; spe-
cifically, 1½ percent growth during both 2002 and
2003, rather than 1¾ percent and 2 percent respec-
tively. Prospects for global recovery are modestly
weaker now than in early April, and the foreign ex-
change value of the yen is moderately stronger. Japa-
nese equity markets have sold off along with equity
markets elsewhere; and this implies particular prob-
lems for Japanese banks in meeting their minimum
capital requirements. As a major oil importer, Ja-
pan would certainly feel a negative impact from a
spike in world oil prices associated with military ac-
tion against Iraq.
On the other hand, there are reasons not to be
too pessimistic about near-term economic prospects
for Japan. Reflecting more positive developments
than were earlier expected, a recovery of modest pro-
portions does appear to have started in Japan; and
most forecasts for Japan (excluding my own) have
been upgraded since early April. Several important
indicators of business activity and sentiment have
either turned positive or become less negative. And,
despite the lack of progress in fundamental and nec-
essary restructuring, the meltdown of the Japanese
financial sector that some had feared does not yet
appear imminent.
For the developing countries of Asia, the situa-
tion is distinctly more positive. As noted earlier,
China (which has by far the largest GDP weight of
any developing country) has performed somewhat
better than forecast; and India is also doing at least
as well as was expected. Moreover, both China and
India are relatively insensitive to both a potential
spike in world oil prices and to modestly slower
growth in the rest of the world; and, looking ahead,
prospects for both of these countries continue to look
quite buoyant.
For other Asian emerging-market economies,
the picture is more mixed. Korea has done well, led
by recovery of domestic demand. Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand have also staged signifi-
cant recoveries, aided by rising exports as well as
domestic demand. Indonesia has sustained mod-
erate growth. But, recovery in Taiwan has been
more subdued, and Hong Kong’s growth has re-
mained disappointing. Moreover, looking ahead,
these highly open emerging-market economies are
significantly more vulnerable to slower growth in
the rest of the world and (with the exception of In-
donesia) to a spike in world oil prices than are China
and India. Thus, a modest downward revision of
the April growth forecasts for these countries, from
7 percent year-over-year for 2003 to 6 percent, gen-
erally seems warranted. Nevertheless, because of
the stronger than expected performance and large
weight of China, the forecast for all of emerging-
market countries of Asia remains essentially un-
changed from optimistic levels indicated in early
April.
The Middle East and Africa
Leaving aside Iraq itself, prospective military
action and its effect on world oil prices probably
has positive short-term economic implications for
the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East (and
elsewhere). Political turmoil that might be stimu-
lated by military action against Iraq is a potential
economic negative, but short-term economic risks
in this regard seem relatively limited. On the other
hand, the continuing Israeli/Palestinian conflict is
clearly having substantial negative consequences
for the (relatively large) Israeli economy and far more
devastating consequences for the (much smaller)
economy of the areas controlled by the Palestinian
Authority. On balance, I see little reason to change
the early April forecast of modest positive growth
for the Middle East this year and next—but recog-
nize that the range of uncertainty has expanded
because of possible military action against Iraq.
For Africa, most commodity prices (aside from
oil and cocoa) remain relatively weak, and this is
an important negative factor for many nonoil, pri-
mary product-exporting countries. Moreover,
For other Asian emerging-market
economies, the picture is more mixed…
the highly open emerging-market
economies are significantly more
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growth in the two largest economies in sub-Saharan
Africa—South Africa and Nigeria—does not appear
particularly buoyant this year. On the other hand,
the incidence of natural and man-made disasters in
Africa this year is below that of many recent years.
All things considered, with a slightly weaker fore-
cast for growth in the rest of the world and worries
about the effects of possible military action against
Iraq, a slight downward revision of forecasts for Af-
rica seems appropriate.
Conclusion
This forecast, like all economic forecasts, is sub-
ject to a considerable margin of error. But the risks
to the forecast are on the upside as well as the down-
side and are about evenly distributed around the
central forecast. A moderate allowance has been
made for short-term negative economic side-effects
from possible military action against Iraq—under the
assumption that there is a relatively high likelihood
of such action. If such action occurs, the economic
side-effects could be more serious than has been
assumed. On the other hand, at this stage, it is still
possible that military action may be avoided; or, if
action is undertaken, it might prove highly success-
ful even in its relatively short-term economic effects.
tries now generally envision growth that is in line
with or modestly below potential, in contrast with
the normal cyclical tendency for growth to exceed
potential during the initial stages of an economic
recovery. Clearly, there is upside room for perfor-
mance to exceed forecast if normal cyclical tenden-
cies assert themselves. On the other hand, growth
in the industrial countries could fall further short of
potential if, for example, equity markets sell off to or
beyond the lows of this summer.
For developing countries, the likely spillover from
somewhat slower growth (than earlier forecast) in
the industrial countries has been built into the cen-
tral forecast. But, if the industrial countries were to
perform below their revised forecast, this would likely
imply negative side-effects for developing countries;
and, conversely, if the industrial countries perform
better than forecast. In addition to this external risk,
several important developing countries have their
own substantial internal risks. These risks appear
to be particularly great in Latin America, especially
for Brazil where the outcome for 2003 will probably
be either well above or well below the central fore-
cast of zero growth.
Appendix: Economic Effects of Military Action Against Iraq
Estimation of the likely economic effects of military
action against Iraq obviously involves a good deal of
speculation and uncertainty.  For the purpose of this
exercise, it is assumed that such action would take
about three months, including the necessary build-
up of forces, and would conclude successfully with-
out massive devastation of Iraq’s economy or long-
term impairment of its petroleum production. Dam-
age to the economies and oil production of Iraq’s
neighbors is assumed to be small and rapidly re-
paired.
The principal economic effects of military action
against Iraq are presumed to come from the conse-
quences of a significant but temporary increase in
world oil prices, specifically, an increase of about
$10 per barrel lasting for about three months. This
compares with a price increase of about $20 per
barrel (in current dollars) lasting about six months
in the case of the Gulf War of 1990-91. The reason
to expect a smaller and shorter-duration price in-
crease on this occasion is that Kuwaiti oil output
will likely remain available and the lag between clear
manifestation of the intention of military action and
its conclusion will be briefer than the nearly six-
month interregnum between Iraq’s invasion of Ku-
wait and the successful conclusion of Desert Storm.
Moreover, other oil exporters have indicated that they
would probably make up shortfalls of Iraqi oil ex-
ports, and appropriate use of official oil reserves
should be able to limit oil prices to about $30 to $35
per barrel—or about $10 above their level in the ab-
sence of military action.
World oil production (and consumption) now run
about 30 billion barrels per year. A price increase of
$10 per barrel for three months would cost oil con-
sumers about $75 billion, and would imply a corre-
sponding revenue gain for oil producers. Prices of
other forms of energy would probably also be affected,
although significantly less than the price of oil. All
told, under these assumptions, the transfer from
energy consumers to energy producers might amount
to $100 billion.
 Because the short-run marginal propensity to
spend out of increased revenue by energy produc-
ers appears to be significantly less than the short-
run marginal propensity to (not) spend due to real
income losses of energy consumers, the direct short-
run impact on world aggregate demand of a $100
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billion shift of income from energy consumers to en-
ergy producers is negative—probably on the order of
about half of the transfer, or about $50 billion. The
multiplier effect (including impacts on consumer and
business confidence) of the negative direct effect is
greater than unity—perhaps by as much as a factor
of two. Thus, as a ballpark guess, the assumed tem-
porary increase in world energy prices might be ex-
pected to cut world GDP by about $100 billion. This
amounts to about one-fourth of 1 percent of the level
of world GDP of about $40 trillion.
 Of course, if the effect of military action on world
oil prices was larger and longer-lived than what has
been assumed, then the likely impact on global GDP
would be correspondingly greater. In particular, the
Gulf War of 1990-91 was associated with an increase
in world oil prices roughly twice as large and for twice
as long as has been assumed for the present esti-
mate; and the impact was probably to reduce global
GDP in 1999-91 by about 1 percent. [World GDP fell
by about 4 percent relative to potential in 1990-91;
but a normal cyclical slowdown following the long
expansion of the 1980s, induced partly by signifi-
cant tightening of monetary policies in a number of
countries, was the predominant cause of this global
slowdown.]  Alternatively, the increase in world oil
prices in 2000, which was somewhat larger (from
the base of 1999 oil prices) and longer-lived than
assumed in the present exercise was estimated by
the IMF staff to have a negative impact of about
one-fourth of 1 percent on world GDP; whereas my
own estimate was a negative effect of about one-
half of 1 percent.
Beyond its effect through world oil prices, mili-
tary action against Iraq will affect world GDP through
other channels. Iraq’s GDP is likely to absorb a large,
negative, short-term hit; but Iraq’s GDP is only a
tiny fraction of the world’s total. For the rest of the
region, the economic effects (aside from those com-
ing through oil prices) are assumed to be small. For
the United States, military action will mean in-
creased government spending that will provide a
direct boost to GDP. But, military action is likely to
be carried out primarily with existing forces, using
existing equipment and available inventories of am-
munition and other supplies. No doubt, inventories
are being built-up in anticipation of possible action
and will need to be rebuilt if action occurs. But,
under the assumption of a relatively brief and suc-
cessful campaign, the increase in defense spending
during the period of military action and the subse-
quent couple of quarters is likely to be compara-
tively modest—surely well below $100 billion. Thus,
the positive effect of such increased spending on
world GDP seems unlikely to overturn the ballpark
estimate that military action against Iraq would have
a negative effect of roughly one-fourth of 1 percent
of world GDP.
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